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“Validation of ultra-high dependability…” – 20 years on 
 
Bev Littlewood, Lorenzo Strigini 
Centre for Software Reliability, City University, London EC1V 0HB 
In 1990, we submitted a paper to the Communications of the Association for Computing 
Machinery, with the title “Validation of Ultra-High Dependability for Software-based 
Systems” [Littlewood, 1993]. The immediate trigger for the discussions that led to that 
paper were the requirements of failure probability of less than 10-9 per hour, or per cycle, 
for some safety-critical equipment in civil aircraft. We thought that the then-typical 
approach to this issue (codified in the DO-178B document) did not inspire confidence. 
We paraphrased (some people said caricatured) the position taken in DO-178B as “a very 
low failure probability is required but, since its achievement cannot be proven in practice, 
some other, insufficient method of certification will be adopted”. We also predicted that 
both this kind of extreme requirements, and the inadequate justification of their 
satisfaction, would spread to many more systems and industrial sectors, as they have.  
Back then, different people had different takes on the issue, but our concerns were widely 
shared. Two years later, for example, Ricky Butler and George Finelli, from NASA, 
submitted to the IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering a paper with the title “The 
Infeasibility of Quantifying the Reliability of Life-Critical Real-Time Software” [Butler, 
1993]. 
This anniversary of the SCSC falls about 20 years later, so it seems a good time to revisit 
briefly our article and see where the debate about these issues now stands. 
Our paper’s main points were: 
• modern society depends on computers for a number of critical tasks in which failure 
can have very high costs 
• thus, high levels of dependability (reliability, safety, etc.) are often required 
• risk should be assessed quantitatively, so  
o these requirements must be stated in quantitative terms, and  
o a rigorous demonstration of their attainment is necessary 
• for software-based systems used in the most critical roles, such demonstrations are 
not usually supplied 
• most importantly, the requirements often lie near the limit of the current state of the 
art, and sometimes beyond, in terms  
o of the ability to satisfy them,  
o and also, and more often, of the ability to demonstrate that they are satisfied in 
the individual operational products. 
This validation problem was the main theme of our paper. We discussed why such 
demonstrations could often not be provided before operation with the means available: 
reliability growth models, testing with stable reliability, structural dependability 
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modelling exploiting redundancy and diversity, arguments based on good engineering 
practice. For each such form of argument in support of a dependability claim, we showed 
how it ran into limits as the requirements became more stringent. Combining disparate 
evidence from these different sources allowed stronger claims, but we concluded that 
these would fall short – often by several orders of magnitude – of what was needed in 
some real applications. 
We said that “engineering practice must take into account [...] that no solution exists, at 
present, for the validation of ultra-high dependability in systems relying on complex 
software”. That is, systems depending on such software could only be deployed with 
limited confidence in their safety requirements being satisfied; or not be deployed. 
Alternatively, less stringent requirements could be set for some systems, at least at the 
beginning of their operational life. In this case, the decision would be rightly cast in 
socio-political terms of acceptable risk, rather than depending on stretching the technical 
evidence beyond what it could prove. 
Revisiting the paper now, we find this basic message is still valid, although technical 
progress has changed some details. There are still limits to the credible claims that can be 
made about any specific system before operational experience. And for some systems, the 
requirements are definitely beyond those limits. It is discouraging to find that in some 
applications, requirements are becoming even more onerous, without matching progress 
in the ability to validate systems against them: for example, the protection system of the 
proposed UK EPR requires a probability of failure on demand no worse than 10-9, which 
is two orders of magnitude more stringent than the 10-7 pfd needed 20 years ago for the 
protection system of Sizewell B. 
Of course, there have been changes over the years in the magnitude and the nature of the 
limits. For example, 20 years ago we gave examples of how a purely statistical approach, 
based on operationally realistic testing or real operation, required very long testing for it 
to contribute substantially to confidence, and the length of feasible testing determined the 
limits to the claims. Things have improved from that viewpoint: with much faster and 
cheaper computers it is feasible to simulate very extensive testing on emulators. 
However, sources of doubt different from the statistical power of the empirical test then 
become more important, e.g. whether the test harness and test oracle are completely 
trustworthy [Littlewood, 2007], and these limit the confidence that can be placed in 
claims. 
There has been disappointingly little progress in some areas in the last 20 years. An 
important missed opportunity has been in documenting the results of these years of 
increasing use of software based systems and of methods for building and validating 
them. A common approach is still that of advising incrementally stringent “good 
practices” for building and validating software as a function of its criticality – see, for 
example, IEC 61508. This is a reasonable approach, in principle, to achieving good 
results. But having used good practice is not a guarantee that the resulting system will be 
ultra-reliable 1. And in practice there is little hard evidence of the effectiveness of those 
                                                
1  It is astonishing – and a poor reflection on our technical community – that there is still no agreement in the 
community that depends on the IEC 61508 standard about what can be claimed about a system’s achieved 
dependability from the fact of its having been built using the recommended practices appropriate to a particular SIL. 
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practices in improving the chances of success. The persistence of this situation is a 
special concern. For instance, formal methods and other means of static verification have 
improved - both in the tools available and the amount of collective experience in using 
them. And yet evidence of their effectiveness – how often, for instance, a property that 
has been “proved” to be true turns out to be false – is not collected. 
There continues to be some controversy about the use of probabilistic measures of 
dependability. Some practitioners whom we respect are dead set against it: they think that 
it is infeasible for design faults, and thus demanding it from the purveyors of safety-
critical systems is a waste of resources and a dangerous temptation for self-delusion. 
These experts tend to be dissatisfied with existing approaches and invoke the adoption of 
better practices for assurance, but without quantifying their results. At the same time, 
others have been citing arguments like ours to justify the status quo, by saying that since 
demonstrating the 10-9 claim probabilistically is infeasible, the DO-178B position on 
certification without such justification was correct.  
We still believe that arguments about uncertainty are naturally stated in probabilistic 
terms (and that there is inherent uncertainty here that cannot be wished away). For 
instance, the differences between these two groups cannot be decided without an attempt 
to argue which sets of practices would give better assurance that a system that passes the 
advocated method for certification will exhibit a sufficiently low frequency of accidents.  
Probabilistic reasoning is the natural way of debating such disagreements. In fact, we 
would now put much more emphasis on the notion of confidence in claims, and treat this 
probabilistically [Bloomfield, 2007]. It seems clear that a dependability claim – “this 
system has a pfd better than 10-x” – is never known to be true with certainty. There will be 
doubts about assumptions made in the reasoning, about the validity of the evidence, and 
so on. Treating this “epistemic” uncertainty rigorously and formally seems necessary, and 
using probabilities brings the advantages of a unified treatment of the different sources of 
uncertainty. Such a probabilistic argument may then sometimes show that we have 
limited grounds for confidence in a system before deployment (e.g. confidence that this 
flight control system has a failure rate better than 10-9 per hour). This is a benefit, not a 
defect, of the probabilistic approach, if risk assessment practices are to be beneficial for 
the engineering profession and the public.  
Explicit recognition of epistemic uncertainty has other implications. For instance, 
recommended practice focuses on avoiding, removing, and proving the absence of, bugs: 
it is not direct evidence about probability of software-caused failure, except insofar as 
such failures could be avoided altogether. It is evidence for probability of perfection, not 
for achievement of a specific non-zero bound on pfd or failure rate. Standards that link 
the practices with the latter implicitly mix issues of reliability bounds and of confidence 
in them. Acknowledging evidence of probability of perfection would bring definite 
advantages in various scenarios (long-lived systems [Bertolino, 1998]; “asymmetric” 
diverse systems [Littlewood, 2010]) and help to focus on collecting useful evidence. If 
we had to rewrite that paper now, greater emphasis on the role of confidence and 
epistemic uncertainty would probably be the main change. 
Finally, we come to the question of “how long is a piece of string?”. What are the limits 
to what can be assured? Many of the references to our earlier paper –
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by authors who are generally supportive of the position laid out there – imply that we 
suggested some hard numeric limits: figures of 10-4 or 10-5 pfd are often stated, for 
example. In fact we did not say anything like this. Our intention, instead, was to show 
how different kinds of argument and amounts of evidence would hit limits, and how these 
could be shifted. So, for example, in the case of statistical testing, we showed how much 
failure-free operation was needed to support a particular claim at a particular level of 
confidence, allowing the reader to judge whether it was feasible (i.e. they had sufficient 
funds) to do enough testing for a particular (claim, confidence) pair.  
The limits to a feasible (claim, confidence) pair about a specific system depend on what 
the specific system is, what evidence can be collected about it, and the state of general 
knowledge about that category of systems and techniques applied. All these factors vary 
between systems, and shift as technology changes and experience accumulates. Claiming 
that the same limits apply to all systems would be absurd.2 Acknowledging that limits 
exist should be a spur to engage with reasoning about specific evidence and its value, to 
privilege designs that support better evidence collection (e.g. having in mind both 
statistical testing and formal proof at the time of design), to favour collective effort in 
collecting general knowledge about methods and classes of systems, finding ways to 
counter market-driven incentives to secrecy, to identify routes for orderly transition to 
sounder practices of certification and licensing; not to retreat into compliance-based 
schemes in which little incentive exists for the learning that alone can deliver progress. 
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